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The claim in this paper is that Sra⁄a employed a rigorous logic of
mathematical reasoning in his book, Production of Commodities by Means
of Commodities (PCC), in such a way that the existence proofs were
constructive. This is the kind of mathematics that was prevalent at the
beginning of the 19th century, which was dominated by the concrete, the
constructive and the algorithmic. It is, therefore, completely consistent
with the economics of the 19th century, which was the fulcrum around
which the economics of PCC was conceived.
Key Words: Existence Proofs, Constructive Mathematics, Algorithmic
Mathematics, Mathematical Economics, Standard System.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: B23, B24, B31, B41, B51
￿Constructive in the sense of constructive mathematics (say, Bishop-style constructivism,
rather than Russian constructivism or even classic Brouwerian constructivism).
yThis paper is a belated dedication to the memory of one of the ￿nest scholars - particularly
of Sra⁄a and the Classical Economists - I have ever had the privilege of knowing: the late
Sukhamoy Chakravarty. I am deeply indebted to my critical friends, Tom Boylan, Guglielmo
Chiodi and Stefano Zambelli for years of inspiration on matters dealt with in this paper. Alas,
they cannot be blamed for the remaining infelicities and errors.
11 By Way of a Preamble
"Besicovitch insists that I publish [Production of Commodities
by Means of Commodities1, [35]]; the fact that I was able to foresee
interesting mathematical results shows that there must be something
in the theory."
Sra⁄a￿ s Diary Entry, 31 May, 19582
Sra⁄a is nowhere, to the best of my knowledge, more speci￿c about these
￿ interesting mathematical results￿; nor is it made clear what he means by ￿ there
must be something in the theory￿- i.e., what in which theory. Perhaps somewhere
buried in Sra⁄a￿ s voluminous unpublished writings and correspondences (espe-
cially with mathematicians and mathematically competent economists) these
things are clari￿ed. It would be ironical if the phrase meant ￿ there must be some-
thing in the economic theory in PCC￿implied by the ￿ interesting mathematical
results￿ , given the almost uniform opinion in the economics profession about
PCC needing to be ￿ eshed out mathematically to make explicit the economic
originality of the book. Especially since the number of people who have made
careers out of recasting the economics of PCC into trivial propositions implied
by the mathematics of linear algebra and, occasionally, elementary topology, is
legion.
Sra⁄a￿ s contribution to economic theory is a well documented chapter in the
history of economic thought. Sra⁄a may or may not have found it ￿ immoral to
write more than one page per month￿([32],p.43), but every one of those pages
are distilled essences of pure economic theoretical elixir ￿at least in this writer￿ s
opinion. I want to suggest that there were also, particularly in PCC, but not
exclusively in that elegant work, mathematical and methodological elixirs still
to be discovered.
From a purely mathematical point of view, PCC lacks nothing. In these
times of increasing formal mathematization of economic theory, the point I
wish to raise is that there are alternative ways of mathematising that may not
lose sight of the economic underpinning of a theory. The concerns in PCC
are the solvability of equation systems and, whenever existence or uniqueness
proofs are considered, they are either spelled out in completeness, albeit from
a non-formal, non-classical, point of view or detailed hints are given, usually in
the form of examples, to complete the necessary proofs in required generalities.
Standard economic theory, on the other hand, is naturally formalized in terms
of inequalities. A case can even be made that this is so that ￿x-point theorems
can easily be applied to prove the existence of equilibria. A case made elegantly
by Steve Smale:
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence
theory of the static approach is deeply rooted to the use of the
1Henceforth referred to as PCC in this paper.
2"Besicovitch insiste che io pubblichi[;] il fatto che ho potuto prevedere risultati matematici
interessanti mostra che c￿ Ł qualcosa nella teoria" (cited and translated in [20],p.193).
2mathematics of ￿xed point theory. Thus one step in the libera-
tion from the static point of view would be to use a mathematics
of a di⁄erent kind. Furthermore, proofs of ￿xed point theorems
traditionally use di¢ cult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has
obscured the economic phenomena underlying the existence of equi-
libria. Also the economic equilibrium problem presents itself most
directly and with the most tradition not as a ￿xed point problem,
but as an equation, supply equals demand. Mathematical econo-
mists have translated the problem of solving this equation
into a ￿xed point problem.
I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems
in the theory of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the
￿xed point approach and attack the equations directly to
give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathe-
matics and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic
overtones."
[33], p.290; bold emphasis added.
Sra⁄a, in PCC, ￿ bypassed the ￿xed point approach and attacked the equa-
tions directly to give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics,
mathematics with [an] algorithmic overtone￿ . That is the main point I try to
make in this paper.
In this brief paper, then, in addition to the above issue, I also want to em-
phasise two issues that have caused unusual and unfortunate misunderstandings
in the reading and understanding of PCC, by so-called mathematical economists
and economists with a mathematical bent, almost all of whom are hopelessly
incompetent in mathematical philosophy and almost equally hopelessly ignorant
about the existence (sic!) of alternatives to classical mathematics3. The two is-
sues are rigour and proof in PCC. The elementary misunderstandings by these
so-called mathematical economists have led to quite incredible assertions about
the mathematical content and validity of the formal propositions in PCC, and
their proofs, particularly the existence proofs. I should like to add that even
some of the mathematically competent - albeit only in classical mathematics
and its underpinning mathematical logic4 - economists who are widely known
to be sympathetic to their visions of Sra¢ an Economics, have made incorrect
assertions and unnecessary formalizations that have had the e⁄ect of diverting
attention from the more basic economics in PCC.
3By ￿ classical mathematics￿I am referring to the mathematics of real analysis underpinned
by set theory plus the axiom of choice.
4Mathematical logic, as distinct from the logic of mathematics, is generally understood,
these days, to consist of set theory, proof theory, model theory and recursion theory. I do
not know of a single mathematical economist or an economist with ￿ o¢ cial￿ competence
in mathematics ￿ whether sympathetic or hostile to the message in PCC - who has tried
to read the mathematical reasoning in PCC in any other way than in terms of classical
mathematics and set theory (plus the axiom of choice) - i.e., ZFC, as it is routinely referred
to in mathematical circles. ZFC, in turn, refers to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system of set
theory plus the axiom of choice.
3I shall, however, refrain from making any comments or interpretations on
the economics of PCC. The economic implications of the methods of proof used
by Sra⁄a in PCC for the economics is quite a separate issue, with which I hope
to struggle on another occasion. One point that bears on the economics, as an
implication of the ￿ equation systems￿approach must be mentioned, however
brie￿ y. A natural generalization, in the direction of economic reality, would
be to consider general diophantine systems of equations. Anyone familiar with
computability theory will know that such systems form paradigmatic unsolvable
systems. But I shall not enter this weird and wonderful world in this paper. If
the case I try to make in this paper proves sensible, I may undertake the more
general task at a later date.
The paper is, therefore, structured as follows. In the next section I discuss
a representative sample of the largely negative assertions made about rigour,
proof and the mathematics of Sra⁄a in PCC. However, mercifully, there have
been distinguished economists, not quite known to be mathematical economists
or even mathematically minded ones, who gleaned immediately that PCC was
impeccable in its mathematical rigour and, to a lesser extent, also aware - how-
ever dimly - that the methods of proof employed by Sra⁄a were sound, even
if ￿ unconventional￿ . The foremost examples of the former class are Richard
Quandt ([28]), Edwin Burmeister ([3]) and Frank Hahn ([18]); a good sample of
the latter set consists, at least, of Peter Newman, Harry Johnson, Melvin Reder
and, above all, Sukhamoy Chakravarty. Somewhere in between are some of the
mathematically competent so-called ￿ Neo-Ricardians￿ .
I go on,then, in §3 to suggest an alternative mathematical reading of PCC
which exposes the errors of representation discussed in the previous section and,
hopefully, makes clear the impeccable rigour with which the propositions of PCC
have been demonstrated by Sra⁄a, particularly the existence proofs.
Finally, in §4, I try to derive broad methodological precepts, particularly
from the point of view of a mathematical philosophy, for economic theory, from
the exercises attempted in §2 and §3.
I would like to add a brief explanatory note, informed by reading two brilliant
works of unusual nature, on a single topic. One by Richard Feynman and the
other by Subhramnayan Chandrasekhar, both on re-reading and re-doing the
mathematics of Newton￿ s Principia. Richard Feynman, when asked to give a
guest lecture to the Freshman class at Caltech, in March, 1964, decided to prove
Kepler￿ s law of ellipses ￿ using no mathematics more advanced than elementary
geometry￿([13], p. 18; italics added):
"Why did Feynman undertake to prove Kepler￿ s law of ellipses
using only plane geometry? The job is more easily done using more
the powerful techniques of more advanced mathematics. Feynman
was evidently intrigued by the fact that Isaac Newton, who had
invented some of those more advanced techniques himself, neverthe-
less presented his own proof of Kepler￿ s law in the Principia using
only plane geometry. Feynman tried to follow Newton￿ s proof, but
he couldn￿ t get past a certain point, because Newton made use of
4arcane properties of conic sections (a hot topic in Newton￿ s time)
that Feynman didn￿ t know. So,.... Feynman cooked up a proof of
his own.
.....
Isaac Newton invented the di⁄erential and integral calculus. There
is little doubt that he used these powerful analytical tools to make
his great discoveries. ..... [However] the Principia is presented in
the classical languages of Latin and Euclidean geometry. The reason
is obvious enough. Newton had to speak to his contemporaries in a
language they would understand."
ibid; p. 19 & 44; last two sets of italics, added.
Sra⁄a wished to speak to the majority of his economic contemporaries, many
of whom were not versed in the advanced mathematics underpinning ￿ Perron-
Frobenius theorems￿ . He presented his work in the ￿ classical languages of English
and the Higher Arithmetic￿ . It is a pity that the mathematical economists had
become immune to the aesthetic elegance of good prose and the deep beauty of
the Higher Arithmetic.
Chandrasekhar5, in his monumental re-reading of the Principia ([6]), with-
out any recourse to secondary sources, undertook to redo Newton￿ s proofs with
modern mathematics, but acknowledged that ￿ the manner of his study of the
Principia was to￿ :
"[R]ead the enunciations of the di⁄erent propositions, construct
proofs for them independently ab initio, and then carefully follow
Newton￿ s own demonstrations. In the presentation of the propo-
sitions, the proofs that I constructed (which cannot substantially
di⁄er from what any other serious student can construct) often pre-
cede Newton￿ s proofs arranged in a linear sequence of equations and
arguments, avoiding the need to unravel the necessarily convoluted
style that Newton had to adopt in writing his geometrical relations
and mathematical equations in connected prose. With the impedi-
ments of language and of syntax thus eliminated, the physical insight
and mathematical craftsmanship that invariably illuminate Newton￿ s
proofs come sharply into focus."
ibid, p. xxiii (Prologue); italics added.
￿ The economic insight and mathematical craftsmanship that invariably illu-
minate Sra⁄a￿ s proofs￿ , on the other hand, have been distorted and obscured by
5Lest the unlikely mathematical economist reader of this paper gets carried away and reads
into Chandrasekhar￿ s mathematical approach a justi￿cation for what he or she has done with
PCC, let me also add the following wonderful caveat in [6], p.44 (italics added):
"This simple notational device (suggested by Tristan Needham) allows us ￿ to
draw on the intuitive power of in￿nitesimal geometry while continuing to pay
lip service to the tyrannical legacy of Cauchy and Weierstrass￿ . "
5the attempts to re-mathematise PCC by economists without the deep knowl-
edge and wide vision one needs to have of economics and mathematics. Chan-
drasekhar had these, for physics and mathematics, together with a deep under-
standing of the mode of reasoning of the classics, not only in physics.
2 Clarity and Confusion in Interpreting the Math-
ematical Underpinnings of PCC
"Hardy was right after all: mathematicians are out to debunk
the fakery that lies concealed underneath every logically correct proof.
But they will not admit that their task is one of debunking; they
will instead pretend that they are busily proving new theorems and
stating new conjectures in compliance with the canons of present-day
logic. ....
[M]athematical proofs come in di⁄erent kinds, that need to be
classi￿ed. The notion of understanding, that is used in informal dis-
cussion but quashed in formal presentation, will have to be given a
place in the sun; what is worse, our logic will have to be accommo-
dated to admit degrees of understanding.
Rota ([31], p.195; italics added)
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Sukhamoy Chakravarty for many
reasons, but primarily because I had some of my most fruitful and enlightening
discussions on Sra⁄a￿ s contribution to economic theory with that erudite man,
not long before his untimely death. When we began talking about Sra⁄a, mostly
about the methods of proof used in PCC, Chakravarty￿ s view on it was expressed
in his early Arthanithi review:
"We come now to the ￿ piece de resistance￿of the book: the con-
struction of the so-called standard system and the proof of its unique-
ness. Here while the skill of the literary exposition is to be admired,
nonetheless the roundaboutness of proofs (if we can call such dis-
cussion proof ), is hardly a factor conducive to clear understanding.
Restatement of Mr Sra⁄a￿ s problem in terms of inter-industry analy-
sis shows how the proof of the existence and uniqueness of such a
"standard system" follows from the well-known theorem of Perron
and Frobenius6 in connection with non-negative square matrices."
6In view of what I think is the ￿ insidious￿role this theorem has played in distorting the
mathematics of PCC, I would like to take this opportunity to correct an egregious mistake on
the origins of the use of this theorem in economics. It was introduced to the mathematical
economics literature by Richard Goodwin in the early 50s during a slightly acrimonious debate
with John Chipman in the pages of the Economic Journal ([14]). In spite of Goodwin￿ s own
clear statements (cf., [16]) on the source for his own knowledge of this theorem (which was
G￿ran Ohlin, who had been a student in one of Goodwin￿ s classes at Harvard in 1949), Desai
and Ormerod state ([12], p.1433), incorrectly:
"This ([14]) was also the article which ￿rst cited the Frobenius Theorem, ￿rst
6Chakravarty ([4], p.87; italics added)
In 1980 and 1981 I had long discussions with Sukhamoy Chakravarty on
the nature of proofs in PCC. I pointed out to him, referring to the irrelevance
and, indeed, the dangers of formalizing the propositions of the ￿rst part of
PCC using ￿ Perron-Frobenius Theorems￿ , that Sra⁄a￿ s proofs were invariably
￿ constructive￿ . Chakravarty listened patiently to the case I was making and
promised to re-think his interpretation of the method of proofs used in PCC. A
quarter of a century later, in a review of yet another ￿ Sra¢ an￿book, Chakravarty
went at least half-way towards my interpretation of the nature of proofs in PCC:
"Sra⁄a￿ s austere prose of Production of Commodities by means of
Commodities can prove more daunting to most students of economics
than the use of matrix algebra. In recent years, an increasing number
of textbooks have, therefore, made liberal use of the basic tools of
linear algebra, including some results on non-negative square matri-
ces to derive the analytical results which Sra⁄a largely demonstrates
constructively with the help of English prose."
Chakravarty ([5], p.122; second set of italics, added)
Apart from my own interpretation of the nature of proofs in PCC as con-
structive, this is the only other mention of such a possibility in the entire lit-
erature on that elegant and rigorous piece of ￿ austere prose￿(with another,
well-meaning, albeit technically incorrect exception in recent years, to be men-
tioned below), that I am aware of. For the rest, the profession simply recast
the economics of PCC in the mathematics of linear algebra and proceeded to
assure itself, as in the gratuitous words of a leading exponent of this genre,
Frank Hahn:
"Sra⁄a￿ s book contains no formal propositions which I consider to
be wrong ....."8
suggested to him, as Goodwin acknowledged, by a young student called Robert
Solow."
7I am in the privileged position of having received a reprint of this rare review from
Chakravarty himself. However, the pagination in the reprint is obviously not that of the
published version.
8The completion of the sentence reads: ￿ ...although here and there it contains remarks
which I think to be false￿ . (ibid, p.353). This is, in my opinion, a statement that is not easy
to substantiate about ￿ remarks￿in a rigorous book, where there is not a single categorical
statement - as remarks or in any other form whatsoever - without rock solid logical underpin-
nings. There are, of course, suggestions, with impeccable caveats - the prime example being
the famous one to end the penultimate paragraph of p.33 in PCC:
"The rate of pro￿t, as a ratio, has a signi￿cance which is independent of any prices,
and can well be ￿ given￿before the prices are ￿xed. It is accordingly susceptible
of being determined from outside the system of production, in particular by the
level of the money rates of interest." (italics added)
7The simplest of examples of how he and legions of others satis￿ed themselves
that PCC ￿ contains no formal propositions [that they] consider to be wrong￿can
be given by taking one of Hahn￿ s own renderings of a ￿ formal proposition￿ , os-
tensibly from PCC. According to Hahn￿ s reading of PCC, Sra⁄a in PCC, when
constructing the standard system, is looking for a positive vector x￿ and a (posi-
tive) scalar G￿ such that the following vector-matrix equation is satis￿ed(op.cit,
p.355)9:
x￿ = G￿Ax￿ (1)
where n ￿ n matrix A consists of elements aij > 0;i;j = 1;:::;n
It is at this point that the usual ￿ distortion￿and misreading of PCC enters
the fray. Having formulated the problem of the construction of the standard
system as one of ￿nding particular eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a system of
linear equations, Hahn goes on to claim, with almost dismissive disdain (ibid):
"We now have a purely mathematical problem for which there is a
standard mathematical result. ... The [vector x￿] is a pure construct
as of course is [1] used in its derivation."
He even helps the reader by referring to the appendix in his own book (writ-
ten jointly with Arrow, but he refers to the wrong appendix) for the ￿ standard
mathematical result￿ . He does not, of course, tell us in the article or in the
appendix of the book with Arrow, what assumptions were needed to prove the
mathematical result he invokes. Nor does he add any caveat on the care with
which PCC avoids any matrix formalizations. Above all, he does not warn the
reader that (1) is not used in the derivation of the construction of x￿ in PCC.
To be more precise, we are not informed, either in the above article by Hahn
or in the book with Arrow to which he refers for ￿ the mathematical result￿ , of
the assumptions, frameworks and the methods of proof used in the derivation
of those results. Perhaps they were derived by hand-waving, appeal to ESPs, or
undecidable disjunctions! In fact, the Perron-Frobenius theorems are generally
proved by an appeal to the Brouwer ￿xed point theorem (although there are
other ways to prove them, too) where, at a crucial stage of its proof, appeal
is made to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, which is provably impossible to
constructivise. Whether Sra⁄a was aware of this particular infelicity in deriving
the ￿ mathematical result￿which Hahn and others wave with a ￿ ourish whenever
they mention the standard system and its construction is not the issue. The
point really is that uncritical appeal to standard mathematical results means
the mathematical and logical baggage underpinning it comes with it and could
make a mockery of the economic rationale for the result and, most importantly,
for the way its validity is demonstrated - i.e., proved.
Richard Quandt￿ review of PCC (op.cit), is slightly more explicit about
appealing to the Brouwer ￿xed-point theorem - so beloved of the mathematical
9Not all of the assumptions in Hahn￿ s rendering are faithful to the economics of PCC; but
let that pass.
8economists and the game theorists, but the curse of the constructivists and the
intuitionists, with Brouwer himself leading the curse from the front10:
"The existence of positive prices and the uniqueness of the stan-
dard system is proved. One feels that the existence proof would,
under somewhat di⁄erent assumptions, be amenable to a ￿xed point
argument. In particular, if the price vector were required to be non-
negative only, the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem might be utilized."
Quandt ([28], p.500)
One cannot help wondering why, if ￿ existence .. and uniqueness of the
standard system is proved￿ , there is any need to make ￿ di⁄erent assumptions￿
just so as to make it possible to use ￿ a ￿xed point argument￿? Was PCC an
exercise in teaching or exhibiting the use of alternative ￿ mathematical results￿
and ￿ theorems￿? For that purpose one can turn to the great and good mathe-
matics texts themselves. Moreover, even ￿ if the price vector were required to
be non-negative￿ , it is entirely feasible to prove its existence by means of wholly
constructive methods, without any invoking of the intrinsically non-constructive
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem.
Burmeister (op.cit) traverses the same worn out path, a little more explicitly
than Hahn and Quandt - and a thousand others - so that it might be useful to
have him state his case, too:
"In Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities Mr Sra⁄a
demonstrates that there exists a ￿ Standard System￿ .... . [A]pparently
it is not widely recognized that the proposition can be easily estab-
lished from well-known theorems in linear algebra. Here a straight-
forward proof is given; it circumvents much of Mr Sra⁄a￿ s discussion
in chapters III, IV and V, and hopefully will be enlightening to the
mathematical economist."
Burmeister (op.cit, p. 83)
Professor Burmeister was a bit late to arrive at the feast! Not even a few
weeks had elapsed after the o¢ cial publication of PCC when Chakravarty￿ s
measured review article elegantly demonstrated the way ￿ well-known theorems
of linear algebra￿could be applied to re-read the book in the way that mathe-
matical economists could. Seven years later we have the same exercise repeated
10Obviously Professor Quandt does not realise that any appeal to the standard version of
the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem means also an appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem.
This latter theorem, because of its intrinsic reliance on undecidable disjunctions, cannot be
constructi￿ed by anything less than pure magic - a fact recognized by Brouwer quite soon
after he had enunciated it and, therefore, rejected it. More than forty years after his ￿rst,
classical, demonstration of the famous theorem that bears his name, Brouwer ￿nally gave an
intuitionistic proof of it. However, he did not forget to add an important remark to that
2-page paper ([2], p.1):
"[T]he validity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [in intuitionism] would make
the classical and the intuitionist form of ￿xed-point theorems equivalent."
9and published in an ostensibly prestigious Journal. But more importantly, what
was the advantage in ￿ circumventing Mr Sra⁄a￿ s discussion in chapters III, IV
and V￿? And how will it be ￿ enlightening to the mathematical economist￿to es-
tablish the same propositions demonstrated by a faultless and innovative logic
of mathematics by Sra⁄a ￿ from well-known theorems of linear algebra￿? Surely,
a competent mathematical economist would be curious to learn new methods of
proof rather than simply rehash ￿ well-known theorems in linear algebra￿? Or is
Professor Burmeister suggesting that the economic propositions in PCC are so
important and innovative that establishing them - of course without violating
the assumptions in PCC - with the more familiar mathematics of the mathemat-
ical economist might serve a higher purpose? But that, too, will not make sense
- because the economics of PCC is inextricably intertwined with the mathemat-
ical methods devised for proving the propositions on existence and uniqueness
and ￿ circumventing￿the three mentioned chapters would be like removing the
good Prince of Denmark from that tragic drama played out in Elsinore. Finally,
it is possible that Professor Burmeister himself did ￿ circumvent￿the three chap-
ters he mentions because, otherwise, he would not have made the statement
with which he concludes his paper (p. 87):
"Unless it is assumed that the economy exhibits constant returns
to scale with the matrix of input coe¢ cients [a0=a] ￿xed, then the
above analysis is meaningless if even a single quantity Xj changes."
If Professor Burmeister is referring to his own analysis when he states ￿ the
above analysis￿ , then he is eminently accurate; if not, he will have to go back
and de-circumvent his reading of PCC to understand the nature of the purely
auxiliary construction in it and why any assumption about returns to scale is
completely irrelevant11 for the constructions and proofs elegantly e⁄ected in
￿ chapters III, IV and V￿ .
Finally, let me end where I began this section, in the sense of considering
a particular sympathetic interpretation of a method of proof given in PCC
but, unfortunately gets derailed due to insu¢ cient attention to the strictures
of alternative mathematics, particularly the mathematics of algorithms, i.e.,
11He may, alternatively, ￿rst read Reder￿ s altogether more competent and sympathetic
review of PCC as a refreshing introduction to the relevant circumvented chapters, before
embarking upon a full-scale de-circumventing (Reder, [29], p.694):
As noted at the outset, Sra⁄a explicitly denies that he is assuming constant
returns to scale. At ￿rst blush this seems utterly inconsistent with the scalar
expansions and contractions of processes required to construct the standard com-
modity. However, it is not necessary that these operations be carried out; it is
necessary only that they can be de￿ned so that for any given state of productive
technique there will be one and only one standard commodity. If there should
be increasing or decreasing returns to scale, this would mean only that the state
of technique ... varies with the level of output. Whether it does so is irrelevant
to Sra⁄a￿ s argument, which is concerned only with explaining the consequences
of technical change (i.e., of changes in input coe¢ cients per unit of output), but
not its ￿ causes￿
10constructive and computable analysis. Kurz and Salvadori ([21]) discuss, in
admirable detail, the discussion between Sra⁄a and Alister Watson regarding,
in particular, the algorithm proposed by the former, in §37 of PCC to construct
the standard commodity. They point out that Watson had some doubts about
the feasibility of the algorithm but that Sra⁄a did not share the doubts. They
then go on to suggest a formalization of an ￿ algorithm￿(ibid, p. 206), claiming it
to be the one suggested by Sra⁄a. However, neither Watson￿ s doubt, as correctly
perceived by Sra⁄a, nor the suggested Kurz-Salvadori ￿ algorithm￿are quite
pertinent from the point of view of constructing the standard system along the
lines described in PCC. Sra⁄a outlines two steps (see below) to be alternatively
implemented to construct the standard system12. Watson is supposed to have
had doubts about the feasibility of the ￿rst step, not its algorithmic formulation,
at least if one reads and interprets the Watson statement literally, which is:
"It isn￿ t quite obvious that the ￿rst type of step can always be carried
out."
ibid, p.206
This is, apparently, the fourth of eleven queries stated in a list accompany-
ing a letter from Watson to Sra⁄a dated 17 November, 1959. Sra⁄a does not
seem to have had any doubts - quite correctly in my opinion - regarding the
feasibility of carrying out the ￿rst of the two steps of his proposed procedure.
The formalization suggested by Kurz and Salvadori expresses the ￿rst step with
an existential quanti￿er (ibid, p. 206):
[i:0] There are qT
i￿1 > 0T and ￿i￿1 > 0 such that qT
i￿1[￿i￿1I ￿ A] > 0T
This is a meaningless step as an algorithm for a computer - digital, analog
or hybrid. Moreover, this is not the way the ￿rst step is stated in PCC. If this
is also what Watson meant with the ￿rst step, which I doubt, then obviously it
not only may not be possible ￿ always to be carried out￿on a computer; it can
never be carried out on a computer. Watson￿ s query must, therefore, have to
do with the fact that he had forgotten the notion of viability de￿ned in PCC
(footnote, p.5; cf. also Chiodi ([7], [8])13.
More importantly, the claim by Kurz and Salvadori that their alleged algo-
rithm generates a sequence that converges is incorrect in computable analysis,
i.e., in the analysis that is relevant for a digital computer in which their algo-
rithm is, ostensibly, to be implemented:
12Sra⁄a speci￿es the two steps in the form of a ￿ gedankenexperiment￿(￿ thought experiment￿ )
of the classic variety, well known to physicists (PCC, p. 26; italics added):
"That any actual economic system of the type we have been considering can
always be transformed into a Standard system may be shown by an imaginary
experiment."
13It is very easy to implement the ￿rst step in the two-step alternating procedure speci￿ed
by Sra⁄a, in §37 of PCC, (see the discussion below).
11"Since the sequence [￿i] is decreasing and bounded from below (￿i >
0), it converges to the requested solution."
ibid, p.206
Not only is it an unnecessary appeal to an irrelevant theorem; it is also invalid
in computable analysis. Many years ago Ernst Specker proved the following
important theorem in computable analysis ([34]):
There is a strictly monotone increasing (decreasing) and bounded
sequence ￿n that does not converge to a limit.
This is the kind of danger inherent in being wedded to one kind of mathe-
matics - that of classical, real analysis - while reading a rigorous text which has
been written without any appeal to the logic of that kind of mathematics.
To complete this section and to make the above issues clear I might as well
be more explicit about Sra⁄a￿ s ￿ two step￿procedure to construct the standard
system. The procedure is speci￿ed for the construction of a mathematical object
(like when ￿nding the solutions to a system of equations attention is transferred
to it as a mathematical object). This caveat has to be stated explicitly lest the
unwary reader infer assumptions about returns to scale in the actual economic
system from the operations carried out on the mathematical object14. Again,
when looking for solutions to a system of equations, the method of solution is
not necessarily something that is implemented by the actual system when it
seeks or arrives at a solution15.
On the basis of the twin assumptions of a viable economic system (PCC,
p.5, footnote 1) and the consideration only of the set of basic industries, the
following ￿ algorithm￿is speci￿ed:
￿ Step 1: "[S]tart by adjusting the proportions of the industries of the system
in such a way that of each basic commodity a larger quantity is produced
than is strictly necessary for replacement." (PCC, §37, p.26);
14Peter Newman￿ s perceptive remarks on this point re￿ects the point I made above on it
being a ￿ gedankenexperiment￿and the whole exercise being an algorithmic exercise by Sra⁄a
([26], pp. 70-1; italics added):
"One could argue in defense ...... that this trick has merely been a computing
device to enable us to ￿nd the appropriate [multipliers]. ...... We are still dealing
only with a hilfskonstruktion, the standard system, and are not committed to the
assertion that if we actually changed levels by a fraction ￿i, we would observe
output to be changes by the same fraction ￿i:
15A sceptical or perplexed reader can, I think, with pro￿t, glean some lessons on this
point from a reading of the many discussions about the role of t￿tonnement in actually or
virtually solving the Walrasian system of equations. My own view mirrors that of Richard
Goodwin who, in turn, was re￿ecting Schumpeter￿ s opinion on this matter (basing himself
on a conversation he had with Walras himself). An early summary of this discussion can be
found in the ￿rst edition of Patinkin￿ s magnum opus ([27], repeated in later editions, too; see
also Goodwin in [15], [16], where the Schumpeter-Walras conversation is concisely reported)
12￿ Step 2: "[R]educe by means of ..... successive small proportionate cuts
the product of all the industries, without interfering with the quantities
of labour and means of production that they employ .... [till] ... the
cuts reduce the production of any one commodity to the minimum level
required for replacement." (ibid);
￿ Repeat Step 1;
￿ Stopping Rule: Terminate the program when, "[T]he products have been
reduced to such an extent that all-round replacement is just possible with-
out leaving anything as surplus product." (ibid, p. 27)
￿ Result: "The proportions attained by the industries are the proportions
of the standard system." (ibid, p.27)
The reader may note that there is a slight ambiguity in step 1, in that a
precise rule for ￿ adjusting the proportions of the industries of the system￿is
not precisely de￿ned. Algorithms have to be almost mindlessly precise. But
this non-uniqueness is not an indeterminacy, as alleged by Kurz and Salvadori,
above. The numerical example given on pp. 19-20 can be used to extract
one such rule for ￿ adjusting￿ . The usual algorithms for solving systems of
linear equations can be added as pre-requisite auxiliaries to extract the (viable)
basic system from the given ￿ actual￿system, before proceeding with the above
algorithm to construct the standard system.
As anyone familiar with constructive mathematics will recognise, the algo-
rithmic construction is the proof of existence. Sra⁄a, then, supplements the
constructive existence proof with a masterly proof of uniqueness in PCC, §38 ￿
§41, without ￿ descending￿into the usual formalistic device of proof by contra-
diction for this part.
Why, an economist with logical credentials may wonder, was there so much
furore over the lack of rigour or proof of propositions in PCC!
3 The Rigorous Mathematical Economics of PCC
"The methods of mathematics are to be given by laying down the
canons of de￿nitions and of argument that govern the introduction
of new concepts and the construction of proofs. This amounts to
specifying the logic of mathematics, which we must take care to dis-
tinguish from mathematical logic: mathematical logic is a particular
branch of mathematics, whereas the logic of mathematics governs
all mathematical reasoning, including reasoning about the formal
languages of mathematical logic and their interpretations. The logic
of mathematics cannot be purely formal, since the propositions to
which it applies have ￿xed meanings and the proofs it sanctions are
meaningful arguments, not just formal assemblages of signs."
Mayberry ([24], p.12; last two sets of italics, added)
13I doubt I shall be saying something very controversial if I state that the
most competent - and, without doubt also the most sympathetic - of the ￿ ￿rst
generation￿of reviews of PCC was the elegant one by Peter Newman ([26]).
Even Newman￿ s sympathetic and competent review could not avoid referring to
PCC as ￿ mathematically incomplete￿(ibid, p. 52), without, however, specifying
in what sense, how or where the book was de￿cient in that respect. However,
he did lay his cards, open faced, on the table (ibid, p. 59):
"[T]he most useful function that this critique can serve is to trans-
late [PCC] into the more widely used Walrasian dialect of mathe-
matical economics, and to give proofs of his main results which are
acceptable to the speakers of that dialect. Translated into this more
common argot, his system may become less opaque, although per-
haps - as in good poetry - there are subtleties which defy translation;
... "
Last set of italics, added.
Not only are there ￿ subtleties that defy translation￿ ; there will be distortions
that deny the readers of a translation an appreciation of the full message of an
original. Imagine prose or poetry composed in a language routinely using the
subjunctive - as in modern Italian - and translating any work from that language
to one that does not use such a grammatical case any more (like English). It will
then be easy, for someone reasonably competent in both languages, to under-
stand the kind of calisthenics required to translate from the Italian to English
(not necessarily vice versa, which should not require equivalent calisthenics).
Any theorem in constructive mathematics is valid in classical mathematics; but
not vice versa. Any practitioner of constructive mathematics eschews the use of
tertium non datur; not so in classical mathematics. This is why Fred Richman
noted, almost with exasperation:
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a the-
orem depends on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that
proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose
proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have
often been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware
whether or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must
be used, in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded
middle [LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distin-
guish between di⁄erent formulations of a theorem that are trivially
equivalent given LEM, although one formulation may have a con-
structive proof and the other not.￿([30], p.125)
The mathematics of PCC is about formulating economic problems in the
form of systems of equations and ￿nding methods to solve them. Where it is nec-
essary to supplement the information about solutions with general statements
of validity, i.e., theorems in the standard sense of the word, then, invariably,
constructive proofs are given; or examples are worked out from which a diligent
14economist can extract a general pattern for an algorithm to make it a theorem.
It is a classic text in methods of problem solving in the tradition of a Polya or
a Simon, particularly Human Problem Solving. I shall illustrate this approach
in PCC with just one example16; the one of ￿ reduction to dated quantities of
labour￿ , in single- and multiple-product systems. Sra⁄a, in PCC, devised the
method of sub-systems for this purpose (Appendix A in PCC). Anyone seri-
ously interested in using this method for reducing a system to dated quantities
of labour is given enough - and just enough only - information on how to pro-
ceed to construct a sub-system for such a purpose. All that we are given is the
following (PCC, p. 89; italics added17):
"Consider a system of industries .. which is in a self-replacing
state.
The commodities forming the gross product ... can be unam-
biguously distinguished as those which go to replace the means of
production and those which together form the net product of the
system. Such a system can be subdivided into as many parts as
there are commodities in its net product, in such a way that each
part forms a smaller self-replacing system the net product of which
consists of only one kind of commodity. These parts we shall call
sub-systems.
This involves subdividing each of the industries of the original
system ... into parts of such size as will ensure self-replacement for
each sub-system."
The assumptions are clearly stated - i.e., those that are underpinned by
the statement ￿ a system of industries in a self-replacing state￿ . The nature
of the problem is unambiguously stated, too. The procedure to be adopted
is outlined in broad brush strokes - after all the book is not a manual for a
Montessori School. The key to the procedure is an e⁄ective interpretation of
the sentence: ￿ subdividing each of the industries of the original system into
parts of such size as will ensure self-replacement for each sub-system￿ , once the
￿ commodities forming the gross product￿are ￿ unambiguously distinguished￿ .
These are obvious algorithmic statements, not involving any kind of undecidable
disjunctions, such as call forth the use of the tertium non datur, an anathema to
the constructivist. That is all - or almost! The careful (and sympathetic) reader
will then remember that there is, after all, a worked out example of a di¢ cult
special case from which to extract the exact algorithmic pattern: the example of
§81 (pp. 68-9, PCC). The rest is up to the interested reader, long ago de￿ned as
￿ that elusive character￿by John Kelly. This is, after all, the procedure adopted
in one of the classic texts in Constructive Analysis ([1]): broad hints for proving
theorems constructively are given, on the basis of clearly stated assumptions,
16Since I have dealt with the algorithmic interpretation of the proof of the existence of the
standard system above. I shall, however, have something to say about ￿ proof by contradiction￿ ,
below.
17The reader would be well-advised to keep in mind the contents of Chiodi￿ s important
paper ([8]) on ￿ self-replacement￿ .
15but it is also assumed that the logic of reasoning adopted will be that of the
logic of mathematics (not necessarily that of mathematical logic).
There are, however, occasional appeals to ￿ proof by contradiction￿ , usually
eschewed by the constructive mathematician, but not by the computable ana-
lyst. There are crucial di⁄erences between the constructive and the computable
mathematicians, but I shall not enter into details of this arcane characteriza-
tion. Su¢ ce it to say that the computable mathematicians are not disturbed by
using the device of ￿ proof by contradiction￿ , especially to demonstrate universal
propositions. In PCC, for example, this device is used in §42, ⁄., to demonstrate
the proposition that ￿ the value of R to which correspond all-positive prices .. is
the lowest of the k possible values of R.￿The classical mathematical economist
would, of course, have recourse to the Perron-Frobenius root and that is that.
Here, in PCC, the proof of existence and uniqueness of the standard system
have both been given in impeccable constructive mode. The auxiliary proof
by contradiction of the determination of the appropriate vale of R is a conse-
quence, in particular, of the uniqueness part of the earlier constructive proof18.
The trouble with a proof by contradiction is that it is indirect and, somewhere
in its recesses, there are appeals to a double-negation, which, in in￿nitary cases
is rejected by strict constructivists. The conundrum is beautifully described as
follows:
"In indirect proofs [such as those employing ￿ proof by contradic-
tion￿ ], however, something strange happens to [the] ￿ reality￿of the
[constructed] objects. We begin the proof with a declaration that
we are about to enter a false, impossible, world, and all our subse-
quent e⁄orts are directed towards ￿ destroying￿this world, proving
it is indeed false and impossible. We are thus involved in an act of
mathematical destruction, not construction. ...
What have we really proved in the end? What about the beauti-
ful construction we built while living for a while in this false world?
Are we to discard them completely? And what about the mental
reality we have temporarily created? I think this is one source of
frustration .. .
Actually, there is a way to alleviate the frustration. ... . It
is based on the observation that in many indirect proofs, the main
construction is independent of the negative assumption. You can
therefore separate out the construction from the negative assumption,
making it a positive act preceding the main (negative) argument."
[23], pp. 323-4; italics in the original.
18As clearly stated in PCC (§42; ￿rst set of italics added):
"It can be seen, as an immediate consequence of the above [i.e., the unique-
ness part of the proof of the existence of the standard system] that the value of
R to which correspond all-positive prices .. is the lowest of the k possible values
of R."
16This is precisely the way to read the few indirect proofs in PCC. In the par-
ticular case of ￿nding a rule for determining the relevant value of R the ￿ negative￿
part of the ￿ proof by contradiction￿can be easily and felicitously separated from
the subsequent positive, constructive, world created. Such a separation is ab-
sent in any blind invoking of the Perron-Frobenius apparatus, to which all and
sundry resort in classic ￿ line of least resistance￿fashion. PCC is not a text
for the mathematically blind and mechanical; it is meant for the thoughtful
mathematically minded economist who is adept at the logic of mathematical
reasoning, even if not competent in mathematical logic and, especially, if not
trained in classical (or any other kind of) mathematics.
4 Lessons for a Mathematical Philosophy of Eco-
nomics
"Student: The car has a speed of 50 miles an hour. What does
that mean?








Student: How in the world did anybody ever think of such an
answer?
Grabiner ([17], p.185)
I have refrained from entering into the various debates on the economics of
PCC. However, I should like to point out one neglected aspect of the richness of
PCC. It is entirely feasible to interpret the construction of the standard system
as an attempt to device an ideal- index number. In fact, it is remarkable that the
famous index number constructed by Doris Ikle ([22]) does exactly what Sra⁄a
set out to achieve with the standard system. An explanation of this observation
will require a complete paper in itself and I must leave it at that, hopefully for
this author to return to the theme at a later stage or, even better, if someone
else takes up the hint and works out the analogies and rami￿cations.
Imagine, now, a world of economists, none of whom were trained in any kind
of mathematics, but all of whom are perfectly wise in the sense of possessing
reasoning faculties. If to this world some enlightened being introduced PCC,
how would it be read and interpreted? In this imaginary world, let us add
to the indulgence and assume also that these perfect reasoning entities, if you
like ideal computing machines, are also equipped with the mathematics of the
digital computer - and no other mathematics. How would they, then, read and
interpret the proofs, conjectures and problems enunciated in PCC?
Such is the counter-factual or, perhaps, the gedankenexperiment I have tried
to carry out in the preceding pages (and in my many readings of PCC). I came
to the conclusion, albeit gradually, that the propositions and reasonings in PCC
were impeccably rigorous and the existence proofs were invariably constructive,
even when occasionally side-tracked by the indirect proofs that were appended
to the main propositions.
17This is in complete contrast to any and every other mathematical economics
text in existence today - naturally, to the best of my knowledge.
For over a century and a half the mathematical economists, ￿rst as mathe-
matically competent economists, have been ￿ trying to ￿t￿mathematical results
and concepts to economic concepts, instead of trying to extract, using the logic
of mathematical reasoning, economic ideas ￿ from circumstances￿ . This is no
better illustrated than in the attempts made by the doyen of mathematical eco-
nomics, Gerard Debreu, in a series of recent papers ([9], [10], [11] to make the
case that the development of economic theory is simply achieved by applying
developing mathematical ideas. It is inconceivable for such people, and they
are the majority of mathematical economists, that an economic theory that is
intensely mathematical can be developed without appealing to a single math-
ematical result but employing an eminently reasonable logic of mathematical
reasoning. The problem, of course, is that the mathematical economists and
the mathematically competent economists seem not to have a clear idea of the
di⁄erence between mathematical logic and the logic of mathematical reasoning.
As for rigour, no one has ever questioned the impeccable rigour of PCC.
Melvin Reder, in particular, and Harry Johnson, too, in their early, appreciative,
but perplexed reviews, were handsome in paying full tribute to the impeccable
rigour displayed in PCC. When referring to the existence and uniqueness proof
of the standard system, the former stated ([29],p. 691; italics added):
"The logical structure of this part of the argument is exceptionally
tight, even for this volume, and further condensation would make
for obscurity. Su¢ ce it to say, I ￿nd the argument valid in its essen-
tials."
Clearly, Reder has understood the ￿ logic of mathematical reasoning￿em-
ployed in PCC and appreciates it. If the argument is valid in all its essentials
and the logical structure is exceptionally tight, why do we require any other
mathematical formalism to understand it quantitatively? Have economists for-
gotten the art of reading English (or Italian, French, German, Spanish, Japanese
- the obvious world languages into which PCC has been translated, I presume)
prose, supplemented with elementary arithmetic, formulations in terms of si-
multaneous equations and a challenge to ￿nd methods to solve them in senses
that are economically meaningful?
Johnson, too, was unreserved in his acknowledgement of the rigour of PCC
and refers to it as:
"[This] extremely elegant and rigorous analysis."
Johnson ([19], p.3).
Can there be rigorous logical structures, employing valid arguments in its
essentials, that cannot be mathematized conventionally? We know, from the
tortuous history of the in￿nitesimal, the Dirac delta function, the Feynman
diagrams, and several other famous examples, that the answer is in the a¢ rma-
tive. These famous concepts have had to wait for conventional mathematics to
18be broadened to encapsulate such rich conceptual structures. Conversely, even
eminent mathematicians, the notable and tragic example of von Neumann is
foremost in the case of dismissing the Dirac delta function and the de Broglie-
Bohm approach to Quantum Mechanics, have been entrapped in their narrow
mathematics to such an extent that they devised alternative theories to avoid
what they thought were mathematically unrigorous concepts.
The problem is that conventional mathematicians associate the notion of
rigour with one kind of mathematics or with one kind of mathematical logic.
That there is no accepted formal notion of rigour is something that is alien for
these practitioners of orthodox mathematics and narrow mathematical logic. A
fortiori, for the notion of proof.
By example and explanation I have tried to show that PCC is an intensely
mathematical text, tight in its logical reasoning, rigorous in its mathematical
demonstrations and unorthodox in the nature of the mathematical formulation
of its economic problems. All who have read PCC also know that all, except
one, of the explicit references are to texts from the 19th century. It is, therefore,
appropriate I end with an allusion to the kind of mathematics in PCC with its
link to that noble century:
"As the nineteenth century began, virtually all mathematical research
was of the concrete, constructive, algorithmic character. By the
end of the nineteenth century much abstract, non-constructive, non-
algorithmic mathematics was under development. What happened,
how did it happen, and why?"
Metakides and Nerode ([25], p. 319; italics added)
Mercifully, as the 21st century dawns, as a consequence of the ubiquity of the
digital computer, we are reverting to the mathematics of the beginning of the
19th century. PCC, in my opinion, was written in the spirit of the mathematics
of the beginning of the 19th century. It has been read and misinterpreted by a
20th century audience unfamiliar with early 19th century mathematics that was
of a ￿ concrete, constructive and algorithmic character￿ . Needless to say, PCC
was also written from the perspective of the economics of the 19th century,
with which the 20th century has also been alienated. The hope is that the
mathematics of the 21st century may inspire the young economists who will be
competent in it to go back also to the magni￿cent dynamics of the economics
of the early 19th century. PCC will be the bridge in both senses.
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